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AGENCY OF R ISK :  THE COMPE T ING BAL ANCE BE T WEEN 
PROTEC T ING MIL I TARY FORCES AND THE CI V IL I AN 
POPUL AT ION DUR ING COUNTER INSURGENCY 
OPER AT IONS IN AFGHANISTAN1
Chris Jenks2
Introduction
Leaders prepare to indirectly infl ict suff ering on their Soldiers and Marines by sending them 
into harm’s way to accomplish the mission. At the same time, leaders attempt to avoid, at great 
length, injury and death to innocents. Th is requirement gets to the very essence of what some 
describe as “the burden of command.” . . . Ultimate success in [Counterinsurgency Operations] is 
gained by protecting the populace, not the [military] force. . . . [yet] combatants are not required to 
take so much risk that they fail in their mission or forfeit their lives.3
In 2010, nine years into Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, casualties among 
both Afghan civilians and members of the U.S. military were at their highest levels to 
date. Taliban4 insurgents employing suicide and improvised explosive devices directly 
caused the vast majority of those casualties. Yet attitudes and perceptions among both 
the Afghan population and the U.S. military refl ect diff ering conceptions of blame and 
responsibility. Afghans blame the mere presence of the United States as the underlying 
cause for Taliban attacks and resulting civilian casualties, while members of the U.S. 
military question whether self-imposed limitations on employing force has led to 
increasing numbers of U.S. service members wounded and killed.
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One of the origins of this angst is the degree and manner by which risk is borne by the 
two groups, Afghan civilian and U.S. military, as a result of the ongoing counterinsurgency 
operations. At the strategic level, military doctrine, including the language in the 
quotation above from the U.S. military’s 2006 counterinsurgency manual, provides 
fundamental principles that govern the conduct of military operations and, in so doing, 
shapes the parameters of this risk. Moving from the strategic level through the chain 
of command to the tactical level, the soldier and marine on the ground, the contours 
of risk are operationalized through the war-fi ghting command promulgating rules of 
engagement and, in Afghanistan, the tactical directive.
Th e tactical directive “provides guidance and intent for the use of force by” U.S. and 
coalition military forces operating in Afghanistan.5 Previously classifi ed to protect the 
force and still classifi ed in parts, beginning in 2008 three successive commanders of the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan have made portions of 
the directive public.
Th e 2008 tactical directive stressed minimizing death or injury of innocent civilians 
and reinforced the idea of proportionality, “requisite restraint, and the utmost 
discrimination in our application of fi repower.”6 Th is iteration, however, did n0t place 
any specifi c limitations on the certain types of force, relying instead on “[g]ood tactical 
judgment” to minimize civilian casualties.7 In contrast, the 2009 directive dictated that 
“use of air-ground munitions and indirect fi res against residential compounds is only 
authorized under very limited and prescribed conditions . . . ”8
Th e 2009 tactical directive “de-emphasized airstrikes, artillery and mortars. Th is 
transferred some of the risk in skirmishes from Afghan civilians to Western combatants. 
In the past, American patrols in contact oft en quickly called for and received fi re 
support. Not anymore. Many fi refi ghts are strictly rifl e and machine gun fi ghts.”9 In 
accordance with this perspective, in not providing the fi re support that otherwise may 
be available, the tactical directive increased engagement times with the enemy, which in 
turn heightened the risk to troops on the ground. Th e resulting concern of some U.S. 
service members wasn’t so much that the tactical directive transferred risks away from 
the civilians to the U.S. military, but that it transferred risk away from the enemy.10 Yet, 
a 2010 review of the tactical directive “found no evidence that the rules restricted the use 
of lifesaving fi repower” or even “a single situation where a soldier has lost his life because 
he was not allowed to protect himself.”11
At fi rst blush, the current iteration of the tactical directive, which General 
David Petraeus issued in 2010, diff ers only slightly from the 2009 version. And 
those diff erences seem little more than an alternatively worded means to the same 
conceptual end—the importance of protecting the Afghan population. But the 2010 
tactical directive seemingly alters the risk relationship and balance between Afghan 
civilians and the U.S. military. Th e 2009 directive expressly acknowledged that “the 
carefully controlled and disciplined use of force entails risk to our troops,” recognizing 
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that protecting the force must, on some level and at some times, be subordinate to 
protecting the civilian population. In partial yet profound contrast, the 2010 tactical 
directive lists protecting Afghan civilians and the men and women in uniform as 
coequal moral imperatives.
Utilizing both the tactical directive and doctrinal concepts from the counterinsurgency 
manual, this chapter will explore the allocation of risk between the military force and 
Afghan civilian population. Th e chapter fi rst reviews civilian and military casualty 
fi gures and then uses those numbers as a touchstone against which to consider each 
group’s perception of the risk they face.
To set the conditions for that comparison, the chapter discusses the allocation of 
risk outlined in recent counterinsurgency doctrine and how that allocation translates 
from the conceptual or strategic level to the operational reality of soldiers and marines 
in harm’s way at the tactical level. Th is chapter examines whether that translation is 
conceptually consistent and tactically viable.
While the concept of the U.S. military accepting increased risk in order to protect 
the civilian population is codifi ed as doctrine, how well is the military translating, 
and training, that doctrine? As one commentator stated, “[n]o one wants to advocate 
loosening rules that might see more civilians killed. But no one wants to explain 
whether the restrictions are increasing the number of coffi  ns arriving at Dover Air Force 
Base, and seeding disillusionment among those sent to fi ght.”12 Th is chapter seeks not to 
provide that explanation but to prompt a discussion on whether there is consistency in 
risk tolerance between U.S. military counterinsurgency doctrine and the execution of 
that doctrine at the tactical level in Afghanistan.
I. Civilian and Military Casualties and Their Causes13
A. Civilian Casualties
According to the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), 2,777 civilians 
were killed in 2010 as a result of the ongoing confl ict in Afghanistan, a 15 percent 
increase from 2009.14 Th is follows a four-year trend in which each year more civilians 
were killed in Afghanistan than the year prior.15 In terms of wounded civilians, 
UNAMA documented 4,343 confl ict-related injuries in 2010, a 22 percent increase 
from 2009.16
While the total number of civilian casualties has been increasing, in both 2009 and 
2010 the percentage of civilian casualties caused by pro-government forces (including 
the Afghan, U.S., and coalition militaries) decreased.17 In 2010, UNAMA claimed that 
pro-government forces were responsible for 440 civilian deaths or 16 percent of the 
total, a 26 percent decrease from 2009.18 Pro-government forces were also purportedly 
responsible for 400 civilian injuries or 9 percent of the total, a 13 percent decrease from 
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2009.19 In terms of the manner by which Afghans are wounded or killed by coalition 
forces, UNAMA stated that “[a]erial attacks claimed the largest percentage of civilian 
deaths caused by Pro-Government Forces in 2010, causing 171 deaths (39 percent of the 
total number of civilian deaths attributed to Pro-Government Forces).”20 However, 
that fi gure represents a 52 percent decrease in Afghan civilian fatalities stemming from 
coalition air strikes from 2009.21
Conversely, anti-government elements, such as the Taliban, were responsible for 
2,080 deaths in 2010 or 75 percent of the total civilian deaths, a 28 percent increase from 
2009.22 Th is continues, and widens, the trend recognized by UNAMA in 2009, that 
“more civilians are being killed by AGEs than by PGF.”23 Anti-government elements 
injured some 3,366 civilians or 78 percent of the total, a 21 percent increase from 2009. 
Anti-government element suicide and improvised explosive device attacks caused the 
greatest overall number of killed and wounded Afghan civilians.24
B. U.S. Military Casualties
Not until 2008 did U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan exceed 30,000.25 But by November 
2009, there were 68,000 troops in Afghanistan and roughly 100,000 by mid-2010. Such 
variance either skews quantitative comparison, or at a minimum renders statistical 
analysis of U.S. casualty rates over time beyond the scope of this chapter. Accordingly, 
this section will refer to U.S. casualty data from only 2010 to provide a frame of reference 
and comparison and not as the basis for empirical analysis.
In 2010, 499 U.S. troops were killed in Afghanistan.26 Improvised explosive devices 
were responsible for 268 of those fatalities, or roughly 54 percent.27 In terms of injuries, 
5,173 U.S. service members were wounded in Afghanistan in 2010.28
C. Casualty Comparison
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Using 2010 for comparison purposes, and speaking only in total numbers and ratios, more 
U.S. forces were wounded, 5,173, than the total number of Afghan civilians wounded, 
4,343. Within that total number, the United Nations claims that U.S. and coalition forces 
were responsible for wounding 400 Afghan civilians. Th us, U.S. forces were wounded 
almost eleven times for every one instance when they wounded an Afghan civilian.
But the fatalities discussion is almost fl ipped. In 2010, 2,412 Afghan civilians were 
killed compared to 499 U.S. service members.29 Within that total number, the United 
Nations claims that U.S. and coalition forces were responsible for the deaths of 440 
Afghan civilians. Th us, U.S. forces were killed at roughly the same ratio by which they 
killed Afghan civilians.30
Agency of Risk      113
Th at comparison provides a reference point for a normative discussion on how the two sides, 
Afghan civilian and U.S. military, perceive the risk that the casualty rates depict, the extent 
to which those perceptions are consistent with the numerical indicia of risk, and ultimately 
how that impacts the overall counterinsurgency eff ort. From the perspective of the U.S. 
military, examining U.S. service member perceptions of risk requires fi rst briefl y reviewing 
the modern doctrine by which the United States purports to conduct counterinsurgency 
campaigns, fi ltered through the ISAF and actualized through the tactical directive.
D. U.S. Military Counterinsurgency Doctrine
In 2006, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps fi lled a doctrinal gap that spanned two decades 
or more by issuing a publication exclusively devoted to counterinsurgency operations, 
the type of armed confl ict soldiers and marines were—and are—fi ghting in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.31 Th e publication provides principles and guidelines for counterinsurgency 
(COIN) operations, including lessons learned thus far in Iraq and Afghanistan and those 
learned and to some extent forgotten, or at least neglected, from Vietnam.
Th e doctrine details a variety of guidance on the risk relationship between military 
forces and the civilian population, including the following:
“Th e military forces’ primary function in COIN is protecting the populace.”• 32
“Th e importance of protecting the populace, gaining people’s support by • 
assisting them, and using measured force when fi ghting insurgents should be 
reinforced and understood.”33
“In conventional confl icts, balancing competing responsibilities of mission • 
accomplishment with protection of noncombatants is diffi  cult enough. Complex 
COIN operations place the toughest of ethical demands on Soldiers, Marines, 
and their leaders.”34
“Limiting the misery caused by war requires combatants to consider certain • 
rules, principles, and consequences that restrain the amount of force they may 
apply. At the same time, combatants are not required to take so much risk that 
they fail in their mission or forfeit their lives. As long as their use of force is 
proportional to the gain to be achieved and discriminates in distinguishing 
between combatants and noncombatants. Soldiers and Marines may take actions 
where they knowingly risk, but do not intend, harm to noncombatants.”35
Th e doctrine also identifi es paradoxes of counterinsurgency operations, including:
“Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be.”• 36
“Sometimes, the more force is used, the less eff ective it is.”• 37
“Th e more successful the counterinsurgency is, the less force can be used and the • 
more risk must be accepted.”38
“Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction.”• 39
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Th e doctrinal guidance on the use of force in a counterinsurgency is markedly diff erent 
than in conventional armed confl icts where the focus is to “concentrate the eff ects of 
combat power at the decisive place and time.”40
Th e counterinsurgency doctrinal guidance is then fi ltered through the International 
Security Assistance Force mission, which is
[i]n support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ISAF 
conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the 
insurgency, support the growth in capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces, 
and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in 
order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to 
the population.41
Th e question then becomes: how should the United States reduce the capability and 
will of the insurgency? And the answer is both through off ensive or kinetic operations 
as well as through denying the insurgency the ability to operate by improving 
governance and socioeconomic development. Protecting the civilian population is 
inextricably linked to both. Th e tactical directive provides the means, or parameters 
on force as a means, to accomplishing the mission, shaped by the counterinsurgency 
doctrine.
II. Tactical Dir ective
Aft er revising the tactical directive in the summer of 2009, General Stanley McChrystal 
made portions public “to ensure a broader awareness of the intent and scope” of his 
guidance to the force.42 While there had always been limitations on the use of force 
by U.S. military forces in Afghanistan and at least one prior version of the tactical 
directive released to the media, General McChrystal’s modifi cations sparked discussion 
and controversy, much of which has continued and remained not just unresolved but 
unaddressed by the U.S. military.43
As discussed in the introduction of this chapter, contrary to his predecessor, General 
McChrystal allowed the use of air-to-ground munitions and indirect fi res under “very 
limited and prescribed conditions.” In his iteration of the directive, General McChrystal 
acknowledged the implicit trade-off  inherent in limiting the use of force at the tactical 
level in support of the broader strategic goal of Afghan civilian support.
We must fi ght the insurgents, and will use the tools at our disposal to both defeat 
the enemy and protect our forces. But we will not win based on the number of 
Taliban we kill, but instead on our ability to separate insurgents from the center of 
gravity—the people. Th at means we must respect and protect the population from 
coercion and violence—and operate in a manner which will win their support.
Agency of Risk      115
Th is is diff erent from conventional combat, and how we operate will determine 
the outcome more than traditional measures, like capture of terrain or attrition of 
enemy forces. We must avoid the trap of winning tactical victories—but suff ering 
strategic defeats—by causing civilian casualties or excessive damage and thus 
alienating the people.
While this is also a legal and a moral issue, it is an overarching operational 
issue—clear-eyed recognition that loss of popular support will be decisive to either 
side in this struggle. Th e Taliban cannot militarily defeat us—but we can defeat 
ourselves.
I recognize that the carefully controlled and disciplined employment of force entails 
risk to our troops—and we must work to mitigate that risk wherever possible. But 
excessive use of force resulting in an alienated population will produce far greater 
risks. We must understand this reality at every level in our force.44
Some U.S. service members were critical of the 2009 tactical directive. As a junior U.S. 
Army offi  cer in Afghanistan queried:
[m]inimizing civilian casualties is a fi ne goal, but should it be the be-all and end-all 
of the policy? If we allow soldiers to die in Afghanistan at the hands of a leader who 
says, “We’re going to protect civilians rather than soldiers’ what’s going to happen 
on the ground? Th e soldiers are not going to execute the mission to the best of their 
ability. Th ey won’t put their hearts into the mission. Th at’s the kind of atmosphere 
we’re building.”45
One noncommissioned offi  cer sent an e-mail to a member of the U.S. Congress 
complaining that the rules of engagement (ROE) which fl owed from the tactical directive 
were “too prohibitive for coalition forces to achieve sustained tactical success.”46 Another 
noncommissioned offi  cer commented to a reporter that he “wish[ed] we had generals 
who remembered what it was like when they were down in a platoon. . . . Either they have 
never been in real fi ghting, or they forgot what it’s like.”47 One news story quoted U.S. 
service members in Afghanistan as complaining that the tactical directive “handcuff ed” 
them.
Th e directive’s limitations on the employment of indirect fi re and close air support 
received much of the frontline criticism. One marine infantry offi  cer said he had 
stopped requesting air support during ground engagements as the approval process 
was too time consuming and tethered him to a radio. Moreover, the offi  cer claimed 
that air support didn’t arrive, was late when it did arrive, or that pilots were hesitant to 
conduct the requested air strike of ground targets. Alternatively, some units describe 
“decisions by patrol leaders to have fellow soldiers move briefl y out into the open to 
draw fi re once aircraft  arrive, so the pilots might be cleared to participate in the fi ght.”48 
While those are perhaps anecdotal and isolated examples, they occurred within a time 
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frame in which both U.S. military and Afghan civilian casualty rates increased. And 
while at the same time the percentage of Afghan casualties caused by the U.S. military 
signifi cantly decreased, there does not appear to have been a corresponding increase 
in Afghan civilian perceptions of safety, security, and the legitimacy and utility of the 
U.S. military presence in their country. From the Afghan civilian perspective, that 
the casualty-producing entity is predominantly the Taliban is little comfort and does 
not constitute protection. From the U.S. service member perspective, if the Afghan 
civilians refuse to place blame for civilian casualties on the entity actually causing them, 
and the only real benefi ciaries of U.S. restraint are the enemy, then why should those 
service members accept more risk?
Th e criticism of the tactical directive seemed to reach its zenith in the spring and 
summer of 2010. In the spring came word of an ISAF proposal to award a medal to 
U.S. service members for “courageous restraint for holding fi re to save civilian lives.”49 
According to an ISAF statement: “[w]e routinely and systematically recognize valor, 
courage and eff ectiveness during kinetic combat operations. . . . In a COIN campaign, 
however, it is critical to also recognize that sometimes the most eff ective bullet is the 
bullet not fi red.”50 As one story noted, “[a] combat medal to recognize a conscious eff ort 
to avoid a combat action would be unique.”51 Th e courageous restraint eff ort, which 
would seemingly recognize the tactical application of some of the counterinsurgency 
doctrinal points listed above, was short lived.
By the summer, one U.S. Army colonel claimed the troops “hated” the tactical directive 
and that “right now we’re losing the tactical-level fi ght in the chase for a strategic victory.”52 
At this point and unrelated to the tactical directive, General McChrystal resigned as the 
ISAF commander.53 But the tactical directive loomed large in the interim while General 
Petraeus was awaiting confi rmation to succeed General McChrystal. At his confi rmation 
hearing, General Petraeus submitted an opening statement acknowledging that some 
U.S. service members were concerned over the tactical directive:
Our eff orts in Afghanistan have appropriately focused on protecting the population. 
Th is is, needless to say, of considerable importance, for in counterinsurgency 
operations, the human terrain is the decisive terrain. Th e results in recent months have 
been notable. Indeed, over the last 12 weeks, the number of innocent civilians killed 
in the course of military operations has been substantially lower than it was during 
the same period last year. And I will continue the emphasis on reducing the loss of 
innocent civilian life to an absolute minimum in the course of military operations.
Focusing on securing the people does not, however, mean that we don’t go aft er 
the enemy; in fact, protecting the population inevitably requires killing, capturing, 
or turning the insurgents. Our forces have been doing that, and we will continue to 
do that. In fact, our troopers and our Afghan partners have been very much taking 
the fi ght to the enemy. Since the beginning of April alone, more than 130 middle 
and upper-level Taliban and other extremist element leaders have been killed or 
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captured, and thousands of their rank and fi le have been taken off  the battlefi eld. 
Together with our Afghan counterparts, we will continue to pursue relentlessly 
the enemies of the new Afghanistan in the months and years ahead.
On a related note, I want to assure the mothers and fathers of those fi ghting in 
Afghanistan that I see it as a moral imperative to bring all assets to bear to protect 
our men and women in uniform and the Afghan security forces with whom ISAF 
troopers are fi ghting shoulder-to-shoulder. Th ose on the ground must have all the 
support they need when they are in a tough situation. Th is is so important that 
I have discussed it with President Karzai, Afghan Defense Minister Wardak, and 
Afghan Interior Minister Bismullah Kahn since my nomination to be COMISAF, 
and they are in full agreement with me on it. I mention this because I am keenly 
aware of concerns by some of our troopers on the ground about the application of 
our rules of engagement and the tactical directive. Th ey should know that I will 
look very hard at this issue.54
In early August 2010, General Petraeus issued an updated tactical directive. In the 
fi rst paragraph of the revised directive, General Petraeus cautioned that “[s]ubordinate 
commanders are not authorized to further restrict this guidance without my approval.” 
Th is requirement sought to address concerns that the issue with the tactical directive 
under General McChrystal was not so much the limitations he imposed, but that those 
limitations were a fl oor, not a ceiling, and that several layers of command between ISAF 
and a U.S. Army or Marine Corps unit in contact were adding additional restrictions 
or requirements.
But contrary to General McChrystal’s express acknowledgment of the limitations on 
the use of force equating to increased risk for U.S. service members, General Petraeus’s 
version placed protecting Afghan civilians and the force on the same level.
We must balance our pursuit of the enemy with our eff orts to minimize loss of 
innocent civilian life, and with our obligation to protect our troops. Our forces 
have been striving to do that, and we will continue to do so.
In so doing, however, we must remember that it is a moral imperative both to protect 
Afghan civilians and to bring all assets to bear to protect our men and women in uniform 
and the Afghan security forces with whom we are fi ghting shoulder-to-shoulder when 
they are in a tough spot.55
Th is language seems, if not inconsistent with counterinsurgency doctrine, an 
avoidance or obfuscation of the subordinate relationship between protecting the force 
and the civilian population which the doctrine emphasizes and the harsh consequences 
that fl ow from that subordination during use-of-force situations.
Yet, the current tactical directive is not receiving as much open criticism as its 
predecessor, at least from U.S. service members. Its impact on the “hearts and minds” 
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of the population is unclear though. Despite the report that in the third quarter of 
calendar year 2010 anti-government elements caused 90 percent of Afghan civilian 
deaths and injuries, in the minds of many Afghans the true cause of the casualties was 
ISAF’s presence in Afghanistan.56
Even with the changed wording the tactical directive emphasizing protecting civilians, 
those civilians feel, or think, otherwise. Th is is apparently due in part to continuing 
challenges ISAF faces in strategic communications—a 2010 poll revealed that 40 percent 
of those interviewed believed ISAF was in Afghanistan “to destroy Islam or to occupy or 
destroy the country.” Additionally, “only 8 percent of interviewees in the south knew the 
story of the 9/11 attacks and as a result had no understanding of the justifi cation for the 
confl ict with the Taliban and al Qaeda.”57 Further supporting an argument that Afghan 
perceptions of their safety and future in Afghanistan are not positive, beginning in 2008 
and continuing through 2010, more Afghans were seeking asylum in foreign countries 
than at any point since the 2001 U.S. invasion.
As one commentator aptly noted, “[a]n American counterinsurgency campaign seeks 
support from at least two publics—the Afghan and the American. Eff orts to satisfy one 
can undermine support in the other.”58 Overt, or at least publicized, U.S. military criticism 
of the current directive seems to have abated. But is that indicative of greater acceptance of 
the implicit risk trade-off s the directive represents? A lesser dislike of the current directive’s 
requirements than those in prior versions? Or is the absence of overt comment simply 
masking continued divergence between doctrinal counterinsurgency guidance and tactical 
realities on the ground? General McChrystal subordinated the military to the civilian 
population in terms of risk allocation. General Petraeus seemed to consider them coequal. 
What then of the U.S. Army platoon leader who, prior to leading his soldiers on patrol in 
Afghanistan, told them, “[w]e are going to go up there and take care of each other. Th at 
is going to be our number one priority.”59 Th us, at the same point in time the operational 
commander considered protecting the military and civilian population equally important 
while the tactical leader on the ground considered force protection more important. Th e 
fi rst needed step is to recognize this cognitive dissonance. From there, the task becomes 
reassessing how the U.S. military operationalizes counterinsurgency doctrine.
III. Tr anslating and Tr aining Doctr ine
Th e counterinsurgency doctrine lays out competing interests, protection of the force 
and of the civilian population. On the one hand, the doctrine claims that “ultimate 
success in [Counterinsurgency Operations] is gained by protecting the populace, not 
the [military] force”60 while “[a]t the same time, combatants are not required to take so 
much risk that they fail in their mission or forfeit their lives.”61
Th e U.S. military acknowledges that “[e]thically speaking, COIN environments can 
be much more complex than conventional ones” and that “[t]he fortitude to see Soldiers 
and Marines closing with the enemy and sustaining casualties day in and day out requires 
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resolve and mental toughness in commanders and units. Leaders must develop these 
characteristics in peacetime through study and hard training. Th ey must maintain them 
in combat.”62
Th ere have now been three iterations of how doctrinal concepts of risk allocation in 
counterinsurgency are implemented through the tactical directive and a wide range of 
service member responses. Th ere are a few lingering questions regarding the evolution 
of this doctrine, primarily: Are the implications of this tactical directive conceptually 
consistent with doctrine, and has the military discussed the ethics of risk allocation 
necessary to conduct counterinsurgency operations?
Th e service member complaints about the tactical directive and the short-lived nature 
of the courageous restraint medal suggest a disconnect between doctrine and practice. 
What kind of discussions is the military fostering through its professional military 
education and other training? Th e U.S. Army’s Center for the Army Profession and 
Ethic (CAPE) provides one example.63 One of the CAPE training vignettes involves 
a new platoon leader who overhears one of his noncommissioned offi  cers telling the 
soldiers in the platoon that protecting each other, that ensuring every member of 
the platoon returns home uninjured, is their mission. While the vignette sets the 
conditions for the very discussions this chapter suggests, CAPE training is relatively 
new, is not widespread, and, more important, not required. One commentator, a U.S. 
Army offi  cer who served as a platoon leader in Afghanistan, recently wrote in Army 
Magazine that the lack of operationally contextualized ethics training amounted to a 
structural weakness.64 Th e offi  cer claimed that “we need to begin shaping a diff erent 
future with a community conversation about ethics, anger and how best to prepare 
ourselves for war.”65
Th at U.S. service members are in harm’s way in Afghanistan and are also trying to 
protect the civilian population is implicitly understood—within the military. Outside 
that group, there is a perception that the military has shift ed the risks of war to contractors 
and that Americans on the whole are indiff erent to foreign national civilian casualties.66 
But is there an explicit training component in place that will ensure all service members 
in the U.S. military have a shared understanding when doctrine espouses the dichotomy 
that “[u]ltimate success in [Counterinsurgency Operations] is gained by protecting the 
populace, not the [military] force, . . . [yet] combatants are not required to take so much 
risk that they fail in their mission or forfeit their lives?”67
Th e U.S. military inculcates its service members with the concepts of selfl ess service 
and duty, among other values.68 Th e military ethos at its core focuses on service members 
looking for the safety and welfare of their fellow service member—the proverbial, 
but in combat literal, soldier or marine on your left  and right. While that focus is 
understandable and even commendable, without frank and candid discussions on 
where and how risk is apportioned and accepted in counterinsurgency operations, is the 
military unintentionally sowing the seeds of dissonance?
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2008 Tactical Directive—General McKiernan
1. We are here to win and that victory is an Afghan victory; a victory which creates 
a secure population which enjoys freedom of movement, eff ective governance, viable 
institutions, and economic progress. We must always keep in mind that what we do and 
how we do it must support the Afghan people and the Government of the Islamic Republic 
of Afghanistan (GIRoA). We must continue to take the fi ght to the enemy in partnership 
with the ANSF to defeat the insurgency and provide security to the population. Th e way 
we act, the techniques we use, and the means we employ must serve to protect and defend 
the Afghan public and reinforce their confi dence in GIRoA and the forces fi ghting on their 
behalf. We will take a comprehensive approach wherein ISAF operates in a complementary 
way with GIRoA and the ANSF. With that as background, I direct as follows:
2. Th e support of the Afghan people for the GIRoA and their collective support for 
ISAF are critical to defeating the insurgency we are fi ghting. We have that public support at 
the national level. We cannot take it for granted and must strive to deepen and broaden it.
3. We must partner and conduct combined operations with Afghan National Security 
Forces (ANSF) in support of Afghan objectives to the maximum extent possible. ISAF 
independent operations must be the exception.
4. Our actions both on and off  the battlefi eld are important to our success. We must 
maintain our professionalism at all times, and always keep in mind the consequences 
of our actions. Respect for the Afghan people, their culture, their religion, and their 
customs is essential:
a. Unless there is a clear and identifi ed danger emanating from a building and to do 
otherwise would threaten our ANSF partners and ourselves, all searches and entries 
of Afghan homes, mosques, religious sites or places of cultural signifi cance will be 
led by ANSF. All responses must be proportionate and the utmost of care should be 
taken to minimize any damage.
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b. All personnel will demonstrate respect for Afghans, Afghan culture, Afghan 
customs, and Islam in their actions and words. On the road and in vehicles, ISAF 
personnel will demonstrate respect and consideration for Afghan traffi  c and 
pedestrians.
c. In order to minimize death or injury of innocent civilians in escalation of force 
engagements, Commanders are to set conditions through the employment of 
techniques and procedures and, most importantly, the training of forces to minimize 
the need to resort to deadly force. Signals, signs, general and specifi c warnings (visual 
and audible) must be unambiguous and repeated to ensure the safety of innocent 
civilians.
5. We are engaged in a counterinsurgency in an extremely demanding environment. 
We are fi ghting an enemy that oft en cannot be identifi ed before he has struck and then 
once he has, he hides among the civilian population. Th e battle is oft en waged among 
civilians and their property. We must clearly apply and demonstrate proportionality, 
requisite restraint, and the utmost discrimination in our application of fi repower. No 
one seeks or intends to constrain the inherent right of self defense of every member of 
the ISAF force. However, Commanders must focus upon the principles which attach 
to every use of force—be that self defense or off ensive fi res. Good tactical judgment, 
necessity, and proportionality are to drive every action and engagement; minimizing 
civilian casualties is of paramount importance.
6. Whenever we believe we may have caused civilian casualties or civilian property 
damage we will immediately investigate the incident. If it is determined ISAF caused 
those casualties or that damage, ISAF will immediately acknowledge that fact. 
Acknowledgement by media, key leader engagement, by shura or other means, must 
happen at each level of command as appropriate. Th ere must be a battle drill in place at 
each tactical level of the organization, and all investigations will be in cooperation with 
our Afghan partners.
7. We presently have the momentum on the battlefi eld and should endeavor to 
maintain it. In equal measure we must maintain the support of the Afghan people. We 
must remember that ultimately the solution in this war will be political, not military 
action. As such, we must always be cognizant of the consequences of our actions and 
public perceptions. I have every confi dence in the dedication and competence of the 
members of our force to operate eff ectively within this challenging environment. Do 
not hesitate to pursue the enemy, but stay true to the values of integrity and respect for 
human life. Living these values distinguishes us from our enemies. Th ere is no tougher 
endeavor than the one in which we are engaged. I direct this guidance to be briefed and 
explained to every Soldier, Sailor, Airman, Marine, and Civilian (including contractors) 
of the force as soon as practical.69
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2009 Tactical Directive—General McChrystal
Our strategic goal is to defeat the insurgency threatening the stability of Afghanistan. 
Like any insurgency, there is a struggle for the support and will of the population. 
Gaining and maintaining that support must be our overriding operational imperative—
and the ultimate objective of every action we take.
We must fi ght the insurgents, and will use the tools at our disposal to both defeat 
the enemy and protect our forces. But we will not win based on the number of Taliban 
we kill, but instead on our ability to separate insurgents from the center of gravity—
the people. Th at means we must respect and protect the population from coercion and 
violence—and operate in a manner which will win their support.
Th is is diff erent from conventional combat, and how we operate will determine the 
outcome more than traditional measures, like capture of terrain or attrition of enemy 
forces. We must avoid the trap of winning tactical victories—but suff ering strategic 
defeats—by causing civilian casualties or excessive damage and thus alienating the 
people.
While this is also a legal and a moral issue, it is an overarching operational issue—
clear-eyed recognition that loss of popular support will be decisive to either side in this 
struggle. Th e Taliban cannot militarily defeat us—but we can defeat ourselves.
I recognize that the carefully controlled and disciplined employment of force entails 
risk to our troops—and we must work to mitigate that risk wherever possible. But 
excessive use of force resulting in an alienated population will produce far greater risks. 
We must understand this reality at every level in our force.
I expect leaders at all levels to scrutinize and limit the use of force like close air support 
(CAS) against residential compounds and other locations likely to produce civilian 
casualties in accordance with this guidance. Commanders must weigh the gain of using 
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CAS against the cost of civilian casualties, which in the long run make mission success 
more diffi  cult and turn the Afghan people against us.
I cannot prescribe the appropriate use of force for every condition that a more complex 
battlefi eld will produce, so I expect our force to internalize and operate in accordance 
with my intent. Following this intent requires a cultural shift  within our forces—and 
complete understanding at every level—down to the most junior soldiers. I expect 
leaders to ensure this is clearly communicated and continually reinforced.
Th e use of air-to-ground munitions and indirect fi res against residential compounds 
is only authorized under very limited and prescribed conditions (specifi c conditions 
deleted due to operational security).
(NOTE) Th is directive does not prevent commanders from protecting the lives of 
their men and women as a matter of self-defense where it is determined no other options 
(specifi c options deleted due to operational security) are available to eff ectively counter 
the threat.
We will not isolate the population from us through our daily conduct or execution of 
combat operations. Th erefore:
Any entry into an Afghan house should always be accompanied by Afghan National 
Security Forces (ANSF), with the support of local authorities, and account for the 
unique cultural sensitivities toward local women.
No ISAF forces will enter or fi re upon, or fi re into a mosque or any religious or 
historical site except in self-defense. All searches and entries for any other reason will be 
conducted by ANSF.
Th e challenges in Afghanistan are complex and interrelated, and counterinsurgencies 
are diffi  cult to win. Nevertheless, we will win this war. I have every confi dence in the 
dedication and competence of the members of our force to operate eff ectively within this 
challenging environment. Working together with our Afghan partners, we can overcome 
the enemy’s infl uence and give the Afghan people what they deserve: a country at peace 




2010 Tactical Directive—General Petraeus
Th is directive applies to all ISAF and US Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) forces 
operating under operational or tactical control . . . Subordinate commanders are not 
authorized to further restrict this guidance without my approval.
Our counterinsurgency strategy is achieving progress in the face of tough enemies and 
a number of other challenges. Concentrating our eff orts on protecting the population 
is having a signifi cant eff ect. We have increased security in some key areas, and we have 
reduced the number of civilian casualties caused by coalition forces.
Th e Afghan population is, in a number of areas, increasingly supportive of the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and of coalition forces. We 
have also seen support for the insurgency decrease in various areas as the number 
of insurgent-caused civilian casualties has risen dramatically. We must build on this 
momentum.
Th is eff ort is a contest of wills. Our enemies will do all that they can to shake our 
confi dence and the confi dence of the Afghan people. In turn, we must continue to 
demonstrate our resolve to the enemy. We will do so through our relentless pursuit of 
the Taliban and others who mean Afghanistan harm, through our compassion for the 
Afghan people, and through the example we provide to our Afghan partners.
We must continue—indeed, redouble—our eff orts to reduce the loss of innocent 
civilian life to an absolute minimum. Every Afghan civilian death diminishes our cause. 
If we use excessive force or operate contrary to our counterinsurgency principles, tactical 
victories may prove to be strategic setbacks.
We must never forget that the center of gravity in this struggle is the Afghan people; 
it is they who will ultimately determine the future of Afghanistan . . . Prior to the use of 
fi res, the commander approving the strike must determine that no civilians are present. 
If unable to assess the risk of civilian presence, fi res are prohibited, except under of 
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the following two conditions (specifi c conditions deleted due to operational security; 
however, they have to do with the risk to ISAF and Afghan forces).
(NOTE) Th is directive, as with the previous version, does not prevent commanders 
from protecting the lives of their men and women as a matter of self-defense where it is 
determined no other options are available to eff ectively counter the threat.
. . . Protecting the Afghan people does require killing, capturing, or turning the 
insurgents. Indeed, as I noted earlier, we must pursue the Taliban tenaciously. But we 
must fi ght with great discipline and tactical patience.
We must balance our pursuit of the enemy with our eff orts to minimize loss of 
innocent civilian life, and with our obligation to protect our troops. Our forces have 
been striving to do that, and we will continue to do so.
In so doing, however, we must remember that it is a moral imperative both to protect 
Afghan civilians and to bring all assets to bear to protect our men and women in uniform 
and the Afghan security forces with whom we are fi ghting shoulder-to-shoulder when 
they are in a tough spot.
We must be consistent throughout the force in our application of this directive and 
our rules of engagement. All commanders must reinforce the right and obligation of 
self-defense of coalition forces, of our Afghan partners, and of others as authorized by 
the rules of engagement.
We must train our forces to know and understand the rules of engagement and the 
intent of the tactical directive. We must give our troopers the confi dence to take all 
necessary actions when it matters most, while understanding the strategic consequences 
of civilian casualties. Indeed, I expect our troopers to exert their best judgment according 
to the situation on the ground. Beyond that, every Soldier, Sailor, Airman, and Marine 
has my full support as we take the fi ght to the enemy.
. . . Partnering is how we operate. Some civilian casualties result from a misunderstanding 
or ignorance of local customs and behaviors. No individuals are more attuned to the 
Afghan culture than our Afghan partners. Accordingly, it is essential that all operations 
be partnered with an ANSF unit and that our Afghan partners be part of the planning 
and execution phases. Th eir presence will ensure greater situational awareness. It will 
also serve to alleviate anxiety on the part of the local population and build confi dence 
in Afghan security forces.
I expect every operation and patrol to be partnered. If there are operational reasons 
why partnership is not possible for a particular operation, the CONOP approval 
authority must be informed . . . 
Partnership is an essential aspect of our counterinsurgency strategy. It is also an 
indispensible element of the transition of security responsibility to ANSF.
Again, we need to build on the momentum we are achieving. I expect every trooper 
and commander to use force judiciously, especially in situations where civilians may 
be present. At the same time, we must employ all assets to ensure our troopers’ safety, 
keeping in mind the importance of protecting the Afghan people as we do.
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Th is is a critical challenge at a critical time; but we must and will succeed. I expect that 
everyone under my command, operational and tactical, will not only adhere to the letter 
of this directive, but—more importantly—to its intent.
Strategic and operational commanders cannot anticipate every engagement. We have 
no desire to undermine the judgment of tactical commanders. However, that judgment 
should always be guided by my intent. Take the fi ght to the enemy. And protect the 
Afghan people and help our Afghan partners defeat the insurgency.71
